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The Kremlin plays the immigration card
Katarzyna Jarzyńska
Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international mi-
grants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic 
growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as 
well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the large-
scale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The 
majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from 
Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the 
escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increas-
es competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting 
the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more 
stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these 
calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where 
most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. 
However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of 
economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of 
the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are 
a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elec-
tions scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking 
both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist 
sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei 
Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the 
government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of 
benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the ac-
tions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling 
elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image 
as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.
The Kremlin’s anti-immigration offensive
Since late July, public opinion in Russia has fo-
cused on the issue of illegal migration mainly be-
cause of an unprecedented campaign launched 
by the authorities to tackle what has been lo-
cally termed ‘ethnic crime’1. The actions the 
authorities have taken include large-scale raids 
and detentions of illegal immigrants in Moscow 
1 A term commonly used in Russia to describe a crime 
committed by an immigrant. 
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markets. The decision to launch the campaign 
was taken after an incident at a Moscow mar-
ket during which a member of the Dagestani di-
aspora attacked a police officer2. Commenting 
on the incident, President Vladimir Putin said 
that the blame for the attack lay with the po-
lice, who have been turning a blind eye to the 
presence of illegal immigrants and have agreed 
to ignore ‘ethnic crimes’ in exchange for bribes. 
Putin called for decisive action to root out such 
practices. In response to the President’s call, In-
terior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev, launched3 
a nationwide campaign aimed at deporting 
migrants working in Russian illegally, and at 
preventing police officers from taking part in 
illegal schemes linked to people smuggling4. 
At the same time, criminal charges were brought 
against several officers suspected of facilitat-
ing illegal immigration. As a result of the cam-
paign, over 2000 foreign workers have been 
detained. Due to a lack of places in Moscow’s 
immigration removal centres, many of the de-
tainees were being held in a special tent camp. 
Following the raids, Russia’s Federal Migration 
Service (FMS) announced that it has drafted 
a new law which paves the way for the estab-
lishment of 83 new detention centres for illegal 
migrants awaiting deportation, and added that 
it was planning to increase the number of FMS 
officers by more than 4500 people5. This has 
not been the only campaign against illegal im-
migrants mounted in Moscow in recent times; 
a few weeks earlier the Moscow authorities, led 
by former mayor Sergei Sobyanin, carried out 
a special operation code-named Zaslon-16, 
which aimed to locate and detain illegal immi-
2 http://lenta.ru/news/2013/07/28/case
3 The raids were carried out on the basis of a verbal order 
issued by the Minister of the Interior, http://echo.msk.ru/
news/1125628-echo.html
4 In Russia, these practices have given rise to a whole ser-
vice sector which includes the physical aspects of people 
smuggling, the provision of counterfeit documents, resi-
dential registration, and occasionally also ‘protection’ in 
exchange for bribes.
5 Currently Russia has 21 temporary immigration remov-
al centres, run by the Interior Ministry. From 1 January 
2014 the centres will be managed by the Federal Migra-
tion Service.
6 http://www.ridus.ru/news/97129/
grants involved in criminal activity. The cam-
paign was widely reported in the media, and 
the city authorities launched a special hotline 
for local residents to report places where illegal 
immigrants might be staying.
The recent anti-immigration campaigns in Mos-
cow were designed as special operations and 
were conducted on direct orders from the 
Kremlin. However, the manner in which they 
were carried out suggests that these were 
only temporary measures, designed mainly for 
show, and that the subsequent detentions tar-
geted specific ethnic groups. The fact that the 
operations were taken ad hoc is reflected, for 
example, in the lack of sufficient space in local 
immigration removal centres, and the fact that 
the makeshift tent camp put up by the author-
ities does not have a legal basis. When pressed 
on the issue, the Interior Ministry admitted that 
the legal status of the tent camp had yet to be 
determined7. Meanwhile, a bias against certain 
ethnic groups can be seen in the fact that the 
majority of the detainees are Vietnamese citi-
zens, even though the largest group of immi-
grants in Russia is made up of newcomers from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, and it is their 
presence that is of most concern to the local 
population. Because of the strong clan rela-
tions among this group of immigrants, they are 
also more likely to become involved in organ-
ised crime. In addition, unlike the flow of mi-
grants from the majority of CIS member states8, 
7 http://izvestia.ru/news/555146
8 Russia offers visa-free travel for holders of passports is-
sued by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Mol-
dova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The exception among the 
CIS countries is Turkmenistan, whose citizens do require 
a visa to enter Russia.
The recent anti-immigration campaigns in 
Moscow, conducted on direct orders from 
the Kremlin, were only temporary meas-
ures, designed mainly for show. The de-
tentions of immigrants targeted only spe-
cific ethnic groups. 
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the influx of migrants from Vietnam can be 
more easily controlled, since Vietnamese na-
tionals must secure a visa before entering Rus-
sia. It is therefore clear that the authorities 
have deliberately chosen a group of immigrants 
whose presence in Russia is the least controver-
sial, in order to not to fuel the already hostile 
feelings towards internal migrants from the 
Caucasus and newcomers from Central Asia, 
and to avoid potential tensions in international 
relations. Similarly, the criminal investigations 
launched against a group of police officers are 
little more than a PR gimmick; although the in-
volvement of police officers in illegal schemes 
linked to migration is quite common in Russia, 
only several low-ranking individuals have ever 
been prosecuted, and their trials were widely 
reported by the pro-government media. 
The election campaign dominated by 
anti-immigration measures
The government’s sudden preoccupation with 
illegal immigration and the corruption associat-
ed with it has been linked to election campaigns 
ahead of the Moscow mayoral race and local 
elections in other Russian regions. By address-
ing the social problems faced by the majority 
of Russians, the current government is attempt-
ing to bolster its faltering legitimacy and is try-
ing to solidify support among the electorate. 
The Kremlin’s recent campaigns have tapped 
into the anti-immigration sentiments widely 
held both in Moscow and in other parts of the 
country, and are seen as a response to the di-
minishing public tolerance of corruption within 
the state administration, which has been wide-
ly considered to be the norm. The decision to 
adopt anti-immigration rhetoric in the run-up 
to the elections stems mainly from the fact that 
some sections of the extra-parliamentary oppo-
sition, particularly the Moscow mayoral candi-
date Alexei Navalny, have actively criticised the 
government for allowing illegal immigration to 
get out of control, and accused government of-
ficials of benefiting from migration-related cor-
ruption. Navalny, who openly uses nationalist 
rhetoric and has taken part in rallies organised 
by nationalists (including the so-called ‘Russian 
Marches’ and the ‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’ 
street protests), has gained popularity in Russia 
as a blogger committed to exposing the corrup-
tion of government officials and state compa-
nies. At the moment, the commitment to deal 
with Moscow’s immigration problem is one of 
the key issues in his election manifesto, and 
serves as a pretext to discredit his pro-Krem-
lin rival Sergei Sobyanin. By adopting Navalny’s 
potentially resonant rhetoric, and by using the 
powers and instruments at his disposal as act-
ing mayor of Moscow, Sobyanin is attempting 
to demonstrate his effectiveness in fighting il-
legal immigration, and thus to expand his elec-
toral base.
Anti-immigration sentiments in Russia
The negative attitudes towards immigrants in 
Russian society, which the government is cur-
rently trying to capitalise on, are leading to 
a rise in xenophobia. This is evidenced by 
a growing number of incidents in which isolat-
ed cases of ethnic violence have become flash 
points for wider conflicts regularly erupting 
across Russia. In recent months the biggest ri-
ots took place in the town of Pugachev9. In mid-
9 The unrest, which turned into clashes with the police, 
was caused by the killing of a Russian citizen by a migrant 
from Chechnya. The protesters, who demanded the de-
portation of the Caucasian diasporas and intervention by 
the government, managed to attract media attention by 
blocking one of the main roads in the region, http://www.
gazeta.ru/social/2013/07/08/5417369.shtml
By addressing the social problems linked 
to migration which the majority of Rus-
sians face, the government is attempting 
to bolster its faltering legitimacy and so-
lidify support among the electorate that is 
prone to nationalistic sentiments.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 112 4
June the public opinion research centre VCIOM, 
which is close to the Kremlin, published the re-
sults of a survey showing that many Russians 
believe that foreign nationals seeking to settle 
in Russia pose the greatest threat to the coun-
try; this opinion was shared by a plurality of re-
spondents (35%). As many as 74% of Russians 
believed that the large number of immigrants 
was bad for the country: 65% of respondents 
said that the presence of immigrants fuelled 
the rise of organised crime and corruption, 
while 56% saw the presence of immigrants as 
the cause of increased competition in the la-
bour market. As a result, 58% of respondents 
suggested that the authorities should impose 
limits on the number of non-Russian-speak-
ing foreigners allowed into the country, while 
priority ought to be given to Russian-speaking 
migrants and individuals of Russian ancestry10. 
Anti-immigration sentiments are particularly 
strong in Moscow, which is an attractive des-
tination for migrants from other countries and 
other Russian regions.
The FSM estimates that there are currently 
more than 10 million immigrants in Russia11. 
The country has traditionally been a popu-
lar migration destination for individuals from 
CIS member states, mainly from Uzbekistan 
10 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114322, http://
www.levada.ru/30-08-2012/rossiyane-o-politike-v-ot-
noshenii-priezzhikh
11 Statement by the Head of the Federal Migration Ser-
vice, Konstantin Romodanovsky, http://www.gazeta.ru/
comments/2013/03/01_a_4992997.shtml; according to 
the PEW Research Centre, Russia with over 12 million 
immigrants is currently the world’s second most popu- 
lar destination for migrants, http://www.pewforum.
org/2012/03/08/religious-migration-exec/
(2.5 million), Tajikistan (1.1 million), Kyrgyzstan 
(500,000) as well as from Ukraine (1.5 million) 
and Moldova (500,000)12. Native Russians, 
however, are most discontent with the influx 
of immigrants from the South Caucasus and 
the Central Asian republics, as well as internal 
migrants from the Russian North Caucasus. In 
contrast to the 1990s, when Russia mainly re-
ceived Soviet-born people from culturally-simi-
lar neighbouring countries, today the majority 
of immigrants are young, poorly educated, un-
familiar with the realities of life in Russia, and 
lacking Russian language skills13. The language 
barrier and cultural differences prevent them 
from integrating successfully. Hostile attitudes 
in urban areas have also been caused by the 
influx of economic migrants from the Russian 
North Caucasus (especially Chechnya and Dag-
estan). The problems arise when the newcom-
ers come into contact with the local communi-
ty. Native Russians tend to resent the defiant 
behaviour of the immigrants, their public cel-
ebration of religious rites, and their inability to 
speak the Russian language.
Another flash point is the large number of im-
migrants who settle in Russia illegally, which 
in turn creates fertile ground for corruption 
within the law enforcement agencies. Organ-
ised groups involved in people smuggling and 
in the employment of illegal migrants often 
bribe police officers in exchange for protection. 
One common phenomenon are the so-called 
‘rubber flats’, which are used to provide 
a home address for several hundred or even 
several thousand migrants at any given time. 
Often the police are aware of the location of 
such apartments but choose not to take action. 
The indulgence of the authorities in such mat-
ters is a major cause of public criticism, and 
12 http://www.newsru.com/russia/08apr2013/migranty.
html
13 According to the Russian Centre for Migration Research, 
50% of migrant workers coming to Russia are unable 
to fill out documents in the Russian language, while 
15-20% do not speak any Russian at all, http://www.rg.
ru/2013/05/ 14/migranti-site.html
According to a poll by the public opin-
ion research centre VCIOM, Russians 
believe that foreign nationals seeking to 
settle in Russia pose the greatest threat 
to the country.
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the reason for low levels of confidence in both 
the security structures and in the political au-
thorities. Russians have increasingly been tak-
ing matters into their own hands in order to 
defend the interests of their ethnic group and 
to fight back against illegal immigration. Such 
grass-root initiatives usually include groups of 
self-appointed vigilantes tracking down illegal 
immigrants (for example, the so-called ‘Cossack 
patrols’, or groups of ‘Orthodox Christian vigi-
lantes’), or alternatively civil nationalist move-
ments (such as Russia’s Shield) which claim to 
cooperate with the FSM and the police. Some-
times, however, the individuals behind such in-
itiatives become radicalised and begin operat-
ing on the fringes of the law; there have been 
several cases of activists using physical violence 
against immigrants or humiliating them in pub-
lic14. Their readiness to cooperate with the po-
lice creates the impression among the general 
public that the authorities support such radi-
cal initiatives and sanction the use of violence 
against immigrants.
Migration as a recipe for Russia’s 
problems
The adoption of fierce anti-immigration rheto-
ric by the Russian authorities as seen in recent 
times is drawing apart from the Kremlin’s offi-
cial migration policy doctrine which it has been 
trying to develop over the past several years15. 
Although inbound migration has been seen as 
a major source of tension in Russian society, it 
is a necessary condition for the country’s eco-
nomic development. This is because the influx 
of migrant labour can help Russia redress the 
labour deficit which the Russian economy will 
14 The footage of vigilante groups illegally entering the 
homes of immigrants can be found online: http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=ucH4iWH7_KI # at = 46
15 It proposes an immigration policy based on a correct 
diagnosis of the problems associated with immigration, 
and underlines the need to introduce systemic solu-
tions aimed at increasing control over the influx of im-
migrants, improving their integration into society, and 
reducing corruption linked to people smuggling. http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-06-20/
a-new-concept-migration-policy-russia
inevitably face in the coming years. As a result 
of the current demographic trends and the 
expected developments in the Russian labour 
market, in the long term Russia cannot afford 
to deport large numbers of immigrants or to 
reduce the influx of immigrant labour.
Consequently, in recent years the Russian gov-
ernment has become increasingly pragmat-
ic about immigration. The steps taken by the 
Kremlin have not aimed at closing the Russian 
borders, but rather at streamlining the relevant 
legislation and increasing control over who en-
ters the country. In order to meet the economic 
and demographic forecasts, over the past few 
years the authorities have been gradually im-
proving the laws governing the entry and set-
tlement of immigrants in Russia. Since 2003 
Russia has been using a system of quotas which 
specifies the number of work permits issued to 
foreigners; this includes CIS nationals, who had 
hitherto been able to enter and work in Rus-
sia virtually unrestricted (they had been able 
to travel to Russia without visas, on an inter-
nal passport equivalent to an ID card). In 2012, 
the government introduced a Russian-language 
exam for all foreigners wishing to work in Rus-
sia legally16, and increased the penalties for 
hiring illegal migrants. In 2013, the authorities 
toughened the rules on resident registration 
with a view to eliminating the so-called ‘rubber 
apartments’ and preventing the abuse of im-
migrants’ rights. The authorities have also an-
nounced that from 2015 citizens of the Central 
Asian republics will need an international pass-
port in order to enter Russia, which they hope 
16 http://lenta.ru/news/2012/12/11/exam
In recent years the Russian government 
has become increasingly pragmatic about 
immigration, because although the pres-
ence of immigrants is seen as the main 
source of tension in the society, it is essen-
tial for Russia’s economic development.
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will increase the government’s control over the 
influx of immigrants to the country. In parallel 
with these changes, the authorities have been 
introducing programmes aimed at helping im-
migrants integrate into Russian society, which is 
hoped to defuse ethnic tensions (some of these 
schemes are being implemented in cooperation 
with the Russian Orthodox Church).
The Kremlin’s increasingly pragmatic attitude to 
immigration is linked to the fact that the gov-
ernment sees immigrants as a way of alleviating 
the negative effects of the decline in popula-
tion observed since 1991, as well as for deal-
ing with the growing labour shortage in the 
country. Currently, Russia has a population of 
143 million people, but this figure has been 
rapidly declining, mostly due to low birth rates. 
Increasing the number of immigrants is there-
fore the most effective and readily available 
way to offset the shrinking population. In ad-
dition, the demographic trends of Russian cities 
could also be markedly improved by the influx 
of migrants from other Russian regions. For ex-
ample, while the fertility rate in the Central Fed-
eral District stands at 1.37 children per woman, 
the lowest in Russia, in Chechnya the figure 
stands at 3.3617.
Greater openness to foreign workers is also 
seen as a way of meeting the needs of the Rus-
sian economy, which is poised to experience 
a labour shortage. Consequently, over time, the 
demand for migrant workers is bound to grow 
as the working population declines. This argu-
ment is further supported by the fact that con-
trary to popular belief immigrants do not com-
pete for jobs with native workers. They tend 
to perform simpler and less well-paid jobs, re-
quiring only basic skills, and typically confined 
to several sectors, such as the provision of mu-
nicipal services, the construction industry, and 
small-scale trade. These types of work are gen-
erally rejected by native Russians.
17 Russia’s average fertility rate is 1.58 children per wom-
an, that is, below the replacement fertility level calculat-
ed at no less than 2.1 children per woman.
Consequences
The Russian economy needs immigrants, and 
taking the demographic and economic trends 
into account, this dependence will rise expo-
nentially in the future. It therefore follows that 
adopting a restrictive immigration policy and 
stoking xenophobic sentiments among the Rus-
sian people by the use of anti-immigration rhet-
oric – particularly in relation to Russian citizens 
from the North Caucasus – is not in Russia’s 
national interests. The recent anti-immigration 
campaigns mounted by the authorities should 
therefore be seen primarily as an attempt to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the government in 
the run-up to elections. However, playing the 
immigration card in this way may have very se-
rious consequences.
First of all, the recent initiatives directed 
against illegal immigrants are likely to lead to 
a decline in tolerance of their presence among 
large parts of the indigenous population, and 
may in turn create a breeding ground for radi-
calised grassroots nationalists operating on the 
fringes of the law. Manipulating public opinion 
on an issue such as immigration can lead to 
a dangerous escalation of hostility towards 
migrants also from other regions of Russia – 
primarily from the North Caucasus, which is 
part of the Russian Federation. A rise in xen-
ophobia, leading to open outbursts of hatred 
(as was the case in Pugachev), could therefore 
undermine the territorial integrity of the Rus-
sian state.
Adopting a restrictive immigration policy 
and stoking xenophobic sentiments among 
society by the instrumental use of anti- 
-immigration rhetoric is contrary to Russia’s 
long-term interests.
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It should also be stressed that headline-grab-
bing anti-immigration campaigns, widely re-
ported by the media, could significantly dam-
age Russia’s image abroad. Until now Russia 
has tried to present itself as a country open to 
immigrants, and has capitalised on the pres-
ence of diasporas by emphasising the close links 
between Russia and the former Soviet republics 
(such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). However, 
the recent decision to set up a makeshift tent 
camp for the detention of illegal immigrants 
has come under criticism from the internation-
al community. In the post-Soviet context, the 
term ‘camp’ is associated mainly with concen-
tration camps, which were an integral part of 
the police state.
The direct consequences of the recent crack-
down on immigrants in Moscow and in other 
Russian cities include legal, logistical and fi-
nancial problems connecting with the deporta-
tion of this very large number of people, what 
may generate significant costs. It is therefore 
most likely that some of the immigrants will 
not be sent back to their countries of origin18. 
The question remains, however, as to where 
they should stay and on what terms. Finally, the 
showcase trials of the police officers charged 
with corruption linked to migration may re-
sult in high levels of dissatisfaction among the 
Russian political and business elites who have 
been benefiting financially from this practice 
and have blocked the implementation of the 
relevant reforms. In fact, the recent initiatives 
launched by the Kremlin have breached the 
well-established informal rules that guaranteed 
impunity for those deriving an income from the 
grey zone linked to illegal migration. Similarly, 
selective prosecutions of those guilty of abus-
es of power will not improve the situation in 
this area. What is needed instead is consistent 
enforcement of the rules, which have hitherto 
largely existed only on paper, and an end to the 
occasional manipulation of public anti-immi-
gration sentiments for political ends.
18 The official reason given by the authorities is the lack 
of documents among the detainees. Law enforcement 
officials have failed to determine the identity of 90% of 
the immigrants held at the Moscow tent camp, http://
www.rg.ru/2013/08/09/lichnost-site.html
